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This paper explains why seemingly irrational overconﬁdent behavior can per-
sist. Information aggregation is poor in groups in which most individuals herd.
By ignoring the herd, the actions of overconﬁdent individuals (“entrepreneurs”)
convey their private information. However, entrepreneurs make mistakes and
thus die more frequently. The socially optimal proportion of entrepreneurs
trades oﬀ the positive information externality against high attrition rates of
entrepreneurs, and depends on the size of the group, on the degree of overcon-
ﬁdence, and on the accuracy of individuals’ private information. The stationary
distribution trades oﬀ the ﬁtness of the group against the ﬁtness of overconﬁ-
dent individuals.Starting any company is really hard to do, so you can’t be so smart that it occurs to you that it
can’t be done.
Kathryn Gould, Foundation Capital, Menlo Park
in GSB Chicago Magazine 21-3, Summer 1999.
1 Introduction
According to DeBondt and Thaler (1995), “Perhaps the most robust ﬁnding in the psychol-
ogy of judgment is that people are overconﬁdent.” Such overconﬁdence induces individuals
to undertake ventures that more rational individuals might not undertake. For example,
overconﬁdence among economic entrepreneurs has been documented by Cooper, Woo,
and Dunkelberg (1988). In their sample of 2,994 entrepreneurs, 81% believe their chances
of success are at least 70%, and 33% believe their chances are a certain 100%. In reality,
about 75% of new businesses no longer exist after ﬁve years. Busenitz and Barney (1997)
compared entrepreneurs’ and managers’ assessments on a set of real-world questions (e.g,
whether cancer or heart disease is the leading cause of death in the United States). En-
trepreneurs and managers were about equal in their accuracy, but the level of conﬁdence
of entrepreneurs in their own answers was dramatically higher. The question our paper
tries to address is if economic principles can oﬀer an explanation for such relatively com-
mon overconﬁdent behavior, which has clearly and reproducibly been documented in lab-
oratory settings to be irrational. In addition, while overconﬁdence and entrepreneurship
are important phenomena in themselves, there is another motivation for studying over-
conﬁdence: Some recent work in economics and ﬁnance (e.g., Delong, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1991), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Odean (1998)) re-
1lies on overconﬁdence as an underlying primitive assumption, often with little theoretical
justiﬁcation as to why such irrational behavior can persist.
Our paper oﬀers a simple explanation for the presence of overconﬁdence and en-
trepreneurs. Our main argument is that overconﬁdent entrepreneurs (independent spirits,
innovators, leaders, change agents, or even dissidents) are relatively less likely to imitate
their peers and more likely to explore their environment. Entrepreneurial activity can thus
provide valuable additional information to their social group.
Our point holds when individual actions can convey valuable private information and
when information aggregation within the overall group is otherwise poor. Our speciﬁc
modeling framework is built on the concept of informational cascades, introduced in Welch
(1992), Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). In this context,
individuals can observe one another and typically end up following the same action, yet
information aggregation is poor because rational, non-entrepreneurial individuals who fol-
low “the herd” reveal nothing about their private information. From a social perspective,
cascades lead to a suboptimal level of information disclosure, experimentation and explo-
ration of the environment.
When overconﬁdent, entrepreneurial individuals instead follow their own information,
downweighting the information in the herd, their actions in eﬀect broadcast their private
information to the rest of their group. Unknowingly, overconﬁdent entrepreneurs behave
altruistically, making irrational choices that are to their own detriment but which help
their groups. Because the herd carries relatively little information, this is only mildly
individually suboptimal. Still, we would not expect entrepreneurs to reﬂect too deeply on
their actions. Instead, we would expect entrepreneurs to be either socially or biologically
“programmed” to overestimate the quality of their own information. Indeed, the presence
of such overconﬁdent individuals who act on their own information and who irrationally
2ignore the actions of other individuals in the group has already been demonstrated in
laboratory settings in Anderson and Holt (1996). Our model can easily be calibrated to
generate beneﬁts to their group that are larger by a factor of 100 than the cost to the
individual.
In section 2, we identify conditions under which the beneﬁts of entrepreneurship to
the group are high and the costs to individual entrepreneurs are low. We then show that
when groups compete, and inferior groups disappear, groups with some entrepreneurial
activity may gain enough of an evolutionary advantage to permit entrepreneurs to survive
in equilibrium. Our paper therefore argues that groups with some overconﬁdent individu-
als have an evolutionary advantage over groups without such individuals. In section 3, we
derive a stationary distribution in which overconﬁdence persists across generations. This
distribution trades oﬀ the relative ﬁtness of the group against the relative ﬁtness of the
(altruistic) individuals that are overconﬁdent.
Our paper identiﬁes some of the forces important to the relative beneﬁts and costs of
being an entrepreneur, and to being a group, culture, society, or ﬁrm that fosters or hand-
icaps entrepreneurship. For example, we ﬁnd that overconﬁdence/entrepreneurship can
be useful if groups are large enough to beneﬁt from the positive information externality,
if individuals have low precision information, and if overconﬁdence is moderate rather
than extreme. There are of course other important aspects to entrepreneurship that are
not modelled by our paper, and not every entrepreneur behaves irrationally ex ante (e.g.,
Manove (1998)).
There are surprisingly few papers that explicitly adopt evolutionary selection (e.g.,
Becker(1976), Ainslie(1975), Hirshleifer(1977), Hirshleifer(1987), HirshleiferandMartinez-
Coll (1988), Waldman (1994), Rogers (1994), Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), Wang (2001)), and
fewer yet that invoke group selection. As far as we know, models of group selection have
3appeared only outside economics. Section 3 discusses the history of arguments pro and
con group selection. We believe a deviation from the individual optimization paradigm in
our context to be necessary:
1. There are many well-documented psychological inference biases that are intrinsically
diﬃcult to defend as being in the interest of the individual. Although some biases
can be explained with individual-centric explanations (e.g., Hirshleifer (1987)), expla-
nations for inference biases should recognize that they are inference distortions, and
individual behavior should follow directly from the inference process. This is perhaps
best to explain in the context of overconﬁdence. When cornered, most economists
tend to argue that well-document overconﬁdence (or other biases) could potentially
be directly linked to behavior that could enhance individual survival, for example an
increase in aggressive behavior (see Section 4). To defend such an argument, one
would have to show (i) an empirical linkage between aggression and overconﬁdence;
(ii) why aggressive behavior is optimal in an environment; and (iii) why it is the dis-
torted inference process that creates aggression. In contrast, our paper’s explains
“following one’s own information” directly.
2. Homo sapiens is unusual. We are constantly judging how altruistic our peers are,
and we are constantly judged by our peers. The ability to exclude individuals from
membership in a society, especially when coupled with our long-term memory, can
be a powerful force towards social behavior. It should not be surprising that behav-
ior which enhances group survival can play a role in certain social situations; yet,
the fact that humans can behave in a socially valuable manner is often neglected in
economics. When altruistic behavior is entertained, the economic literature often
simply enters it directly into the utility function. We believe group selection can oﬀer
4a model disciplining mechanism about which irrational and near-rational behavior
may reasonably enter a utility function and which may not.
3. Groups can evolve mechanisms that are surprisingly eﬀective at overcoming a public
goods problem. For example, the costs to being overconﬁdent can be trivial, and indi-
vidual costs can be orders of magnitudes less than the beneﬁts to the group. In many
situations, it is diﬃcult to imagine that alternative mechanisms (e.g., cultural mecha-
nisms, such as large-scale coordination by credible communication) have lower social
or individual costs—aside from the fact that they were not feasible when evolution
shaped our psyche.
4. Because economics has been faced with such puzzling psychological biases, it has
developed a chasm between a “behavioral literature,” which takes documented psy-
chological biases as primitives but rarely oﬀers an explanation for why these biases
are so pervasive; and a “rational literature,” which de-facto argues that only indi-
vidually rational behavior can survive in an evolutionary or market setting and which
consequently often tends to discount even near-rational behavior. The use of optimal
group-selection mechanisms oﬀends both camps equally, but (or perhaps because) it
holds the promise of reconciliation between them.
In the end, one goal of our paper is to develop a disciplined approach to the investigation
of seemingly irrational inferences and behavior, based on group selection principles. In
particular, the point of our paper is not to show that informational cascades can (and have
been documented to) be broken by overconﬁdent behavior, but that overconﬁdent behavior
creates a large positive externality on public information aggregation and small costs on
its perpetrators. In a group selection framework, this allows overconﬁdence to survive. As
such, our theory has the potential both to explain why we are overconﬁdent and to oﬀer
new insights under what circumstances overconﬁdence is most likely to be useful and
5thus appear. Our paper does not propose to deemphasize self-interested behavior and
individual selection—indeed, it is the stronger force when payoﬀs are equal. But group
selection, in which the cost to the irrational individual is very low and the beneﬁt to the
group is very high, can help us understand documented individually irrational biases that
are otherwise diﬃcult to explain.
Our paper now proceeds as follows: The formal model in Section 2 derives the so-
cially optimal proportion of entrepreneurs. It is purposely kept as simple and focused
as possible. It ends with a brief summary of factors inﬂuencing the tradeoﬀ between the
informational externality and entrepreneurial attrition. Section 3 derives the stationary dis-
tribution, i.e., the tradeoﬀ between inter-group and intra-group selection. It also discusses
arguments pro and con group selection—familiar to readers of the biology literature—as
they pertain to our model. Section 4 discusses alternative explanations for the presence
of overconﬁdence and entrepreneurs. Brieﬂy, overconﬁdence could also be explained as a
signal that helps individuals convince others of high ability; entrepreneurship could also
be explained as a high-risk but value-maximizing alternative. These explanations are not
only diﬀerent from those advanced in our model, but also (and more importantly) are
complementary to our own explanation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We now develop a simple model to illustrate that overconﬁdence can impose only small
costs on entrepreneurs (individuals that put too much weight on their own information)
but provide large beneﬁts in terms of revealing their private information to their groups.
Although our speciﬁc model is based on the cascades framework, it could have equally well
been based on a diﬀerent framework (e.g., a two-armed bandit search model). The basic
6intuition and comparative statics would be similar. Our goal is to show that overconﬁdent
behavior can create an externality that improves public information aggregation.
2.1 Available Information
Assume that members of a group of N risk-neutral individuals choose in sequence whether
or not to take an action with uncertain value, . The action is costless and the true value of
 is either  1 or 1, each with prior probability 1=2. No individual can observe the true
value of , but each individual can privately observe an i.i.d. signal which is correlated with
. For simplicity, we assume that if   1 then each individual observes a private signal
H(igh) with probability 1 > p > 1=2 and a signal L(ow) with probability q  1   p. Thus, if
  1, individuals are more likely to observe H. Conversely, if    1 then individuals
observe the signal L with probability p and the signal H with probability q. In this setting,
a higher value of p implies that the signal is more informative. Table 1 summarizes the
information structure.
Value State
Signal Value   1    1
H p q
L q p
Table 1: Information Structure.
The group of individuals is sequenced randomly and exogenously. Each individual
chooses a publicly visible action, either to adopt (A), to reject (R), or to abstain from deci-
sion. Adopting (rejecting) has higher expected payoﬀs if it is more likely that the state is
  1 (   1). Without loss of generality, we assume that the individual abstains if and
only if she is indiﬀerent between adopting and rejecting. There are two types of individuals
in this model who diﬀer only in one respect:
7Normal Individuals are fully rational in that they base their decisions optimally on both
publicly available information and their individual private information.
Entrepreneurs base their decisions on both publicly available and their own information,
but they do not put enough weight (in Bayesian terms) on the public information.
This deﬁnition of overconﬁdence conforms to the deﬁnition employed in recent ﬁ-
nance models (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)) and to the ﬁndings in
Anderson and Holt (1996): Individuals are either relatively more “skeptical” about ex-
ternalinformationorrelatively more“overconﬁdent”aboutinternalizedinformation.1
Forcomputationalsimplicity, weassumethatthetypeofeachindividualispublicknowledge.2
We deﬁne  to be the proportion of entrepreneurs in the group. Note that  is not nec-
essarily the incidence of overconﬁdent actions—even an overconﬁdent entrepreneur can
ﬁnd himself in a situation in which the public information is so overwhelming that even
he still follows the public information.
2.2 Normal Individuals’ Decision Rule
The decision rule for normal individuals optimally uses their private information signal
and information contained in the decisions of individuals that arrived earlier. The payoﬀ
and information structure is such that normal individuals adopt if   1 is more likely
than    1. In our setup, this occurs when individuals can infer that more H signals have
been observed than L signals.
Let Sn be the number of H signals less the number of L signals that can be inferred by
all individuals from the actions of the ﬁrst n arrivals. Thus, Sn  Sn 11 if all individuals
can infer that the nth individual’s signal was H, Sn  Sn 1   1 if all individuals can infer
that the nth individual’s signal was L, and Sn  Sn 1 if an individual cannot infer anything
8about the nth individual’s signal. It is straightforward to show that, within our information
structure, the state of information at any stage n is completely summarized by Sn.
The normal individuals’ optimal decision rule is as follows: The nth individual adopts
if (i) Sn 1  0 and she observes H; or (ii) Sn 1  2 and she observes L. Stated diﬀerently,
the nth individual adopts if Sn  1.
To understand the information content of past decisions, consider the cascade scenario
in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), in which there are no entrepreneurs (  0).
If the ﬁrst arrival observes the signal H, then the conditional expected value of adopting
is p   q > 0 and therefore the ﬁrst individual adopts. Even though the ﬁrst individual’s
information is private, all individuals can infer from the ﬁrst individual’s action that she
observed the signal H and thus S1  1. Now suppose the second individual observes the
signal L. Conditional on the sequence of signals HL the expected value of adopting is 0 and
the individual is indiﬀerent between adopting and rejecting, and, by assumption, the indi-
vidual abstains. Consequently, if the ﬁrst individual adopts and the second abstains then
all individuals know that HL has occurred, thus S2  0. However, if the second individual
also adopts, all individuals know that HH has occurred, thus S2  2; and the third indi-
vidual adopts regardless of her private information. Because this action is uninformative,
the fourth individual also adopts regardless of her private information, and this contin-
ues for all future individuals. Similarly, when Sn 1   2 all subsequent arrivals reject.
Sn  2 and Sn   2 are absorbing states, and all future arrivals will conform, adopting
or rejecting, respectively. The group gets entrenched in “good” or “bad” cascades. In a
“good cascade,” everyone gets locked into adopting (rejecting) if   1 (   1). In a “bad
cascade,” everyone gets locked into rejecting (adopting) if   1 (   1). The probability
of such a bad cascade can be quite high; for example, if p  0:51, it approaches 48% even
in large groups.
92.3 Entrepreneurs’ Decision Rule
Entrepreneurs also use both publicly available information and their own private infor-
mation, but place too much weight on the latter. We assume that entrepreneurs be-
lieve their signal has precision p0 > p. For a given p, this leads them to follow their
own signal if jSn 1j < k and to behave like normal individuals and follow the crowd if
jSn 1j  k, where the critical state k increases monotonically with p0. (The condition that
entrepreneurs always follow their own information if and only if jSn 1j < k is equivalent to
pk 1=pk 1qk 1 < p0 < pk=pkqk.) Once the public information becomes suﬃciently
overwhelming, even if every individual were overconﬁdent, irrationally overconﬁdent ac-
tions cease in our model and entrepreneurs suppress their eagerness to ignore the public
information in favor of their more limited private information. If p0  1, the critical state
k is inﬁnity, and public information never tempers overconﬁdent actions. If p0  p, then
k  2 and entrepreneurs are like normal individuals, regardless of the current state.
The decision rule for entrepreneurs is similar to those of normal individuals. The
entrepreneur ignores public information and follows the private information (adopt if H,
reject if L) if the state of information prior to their arrival satisﬁes jSn 1j < k. However,
if jSn 1j  k, entrepreneurs follow their predecessor. The information states k and  k
are absorbing states because, once reached, no one can infer the information signals of
subsequent individuals. In eﬀect, having entrepreneurs expands the “non-cascade action
interval” between the absorbing cascades states from  2 and 2 to  k and k. Once k




overall. We begin with the normal types. Let ˜ VR;n denote the random payoﬀ to the nth
arrival if she is a normal type and let E˜ VR;n denote its unconditional expectation.
Because the model is symmetric, we only have to consider the cases when she adopts.
First, suppose the true value state is   1 in which case adopters get a payoﬀ of 1.
Rational types adopt if Sn  1 which occurs with probability PrSn  1j  1. Yet, if the
true value state is    1, adopters receive a payoﬀ of  1, which occurs with probability
PrSn  1j   1. Thus,
E˜ VR;n  PrAdoptj  1  Pr  1   PrAdoptj   1  Pr   1
 1=2  PrSn  1j  1   PrSn  1j   1
 1=2  PrSn  1j  1   PrSn   1j  1 ; (1)
because PrSn  1j   1  PrSn   1j  1.
Let ˜ VOC;n denote the random payoﬀ to the nth arrival if she is an entrepreneur. An
entrepreneur adopts either if she receives a private high signal and the state is not above k
or below  k, and if the critical state k that produces an adopt-cascade has already been
reached:
PrAdopt j   1  p  PrjSn 1j < k j   1  PrSn 1  k j   1 ; (2)
and
PrAdopt j    1  q  PrjSn 1j < k j   1  PrSn 1  k j   1 : (3)
11Thus, an entrepreneur expects to receive
E˜ VOC;n  1=2  p  PrjSn 1j < k j   1   q  PrjSn 1j < k j    1
 PrSn 1  k j   1   PrSn 1  k j    1 : (4)
No closed form solution exists for these probabilities for p 2 1=2;1, but we can derive
a recursion formula to compute these probabilities numerically (in the Appendix).
The overall group payoﬀ is the expected payoﬀ to individuals in the group,











   E˜ VOC  1     E˜ VR : (5)
From a group perspective, the presence of entrepreneurs in the group helps in that it re-
leases more information, which makes it more likely that most individuals choose correctly;
and hurts in that entrepreneurs make more frequent mistakes, which hurts themselves and
thus lowers the average group payoﬀ.
2.5 The Solution: The Socially Optimal Proportion Of Entrepreneurs (?)
We begin by determining the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs from a social welfare
perspective, ?. The social welfare function is deﬁned as E˜ V in (5), which is maxi-
mized by some ?. The following proposition describes the impact of entrepreneurs—a
positive externality–on normal individuals:
Proposition 1
121. The (ex-ante) probability that a normal individual makes an incorrect decision de-
creases with the proportion of entrepreneurs in the group (), with the degree of over-
conﬁdence among entrepreneurs (kp0;p), and with the size of the group N.
2. The limiting probability (n ! 1) of being in an incorrect cascade equals q2=p2  q2
if   0 and qk=pk  qk for all  > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Figure 1 shows the eﬀect of the proportion of entrepreneurs () on the decisions of
the normal individuals. Having entrepreneurs shifts probability mass from being in an
incorrect cascade to being in a correct cascade.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
2.6 Comparative Statics
Intermediate levels of overconﬁdence are best for ﬁxed N and p.
There are three parameters in our model that inﬂuence the optimal proportion of en-
trepreneurs (?): the group size (N), the information precision (p), and the degree of
overconﬁdence (kp0;p).
Unfortunately, the eﬀect of the three parameters on ? cannot generally be solved
analytically. However, numerical simulations show that certain directional inﬂuences of
the parameters p, p0, and N on the solution ? are present—and to the extent that we
cover the relevant parameter space, we can conjecture that they are pervasive.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
13Degree of Overconﬁdence (p0). Figure 2 shows that the optimal proportion of en-
trepreneurs in the group decreases as the degree of overconﬁdence increases. When over-
conﬁdence is extreme, entrepreneurs make more mistakes but provide more information
than moderately overconﬁdent entrepreneurs. However, the marginal value of the extra
information is small because it arrives when the public state of information is already very
informative. Thus, it is beneﬁcial to the group to have fewer entrepreneurs as overconﬁ-
dence becomes more extreme. The ﬁgure also shows that if overconﬁdence is modest it
can be socially optimal for the group to consist entirely of entrepreneurs. When overcon-
ﬁdence is modest, entrepreneurs provide extra information when it is most valuable and
make few extra mistakes relative to normal types.
We also compared social welfare for all degrees of overconﬁdence (p0). The social
welfare function is typically highest for intermediate levels of overconﬁdence. For ﬁxed
p, greater overconﬁdence (p0) is better for larger N. For ﬁxed N, less overconﬁdence p0 is
better for larger p. Interestingly, Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) and Wang (2001) demonstrate a
similar result in diﬀerent settings. (Obviously, holding everything else constant, increasing
N and p improves the social welfare function.)
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Signal Precision (p). Figure 3 shows that the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs
decreases in the private signal precision (p)—except in rare border cases (not plotted).
Typically, when p is low, there are more bad cascades in the absence of information ag-
gregation and the cost to being an entrepreneur is lower. This favors the presence of
entrepreneurs. The ﬁgure also shows that large groups require more entrepreneurs than
small groups when private signal precision is either very low or very high. Thus, the eﬀect
of group growth on entrepreneurship depends on signal precision: for very low and very
high private information precision, group growth translates into an increased optimal pro-
14portion of entrepreneurs. For intermediate private information precision, group growth
translates into a smaller, optimal proportion of entrepreneurs.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Group Size (N). Figure 4 shows that the eﬀect of the group size (N) on the optimal ?
is ambiguous and depends on the level of overconﬁdence. First, consider the case where
entrepreneurs exhibit extreme overconﬁdence. Such entrepreneurs provide a positive ex-
ternality only to the normal types in the group, because all other entrepreneurs completely
ignore the public information. When the group is small, entrepreneurs provide few beneﬁts
because there are few individuals following them who can take advantage of the positive
information externality. Consequently, a small proportion of entrepreneurs is optimal.
Similarly, if the group is very large, even a small proportion of entrepreneurs can repre-
sent a high absolute number of entrepreneurs (additional pieces of information), almost
assuring a correct cascade. Again, a small proportion of entrepreneurs is optimal. The op-
timal proportion of entrepreneurs is highest for intermediate group sizes. Now consider
the case where entrepreneurs are not perfectly but only moderately overconﬁdent (k  1).
The above arguments continue to be true—except that entrepreneurs act like normal in-
dividuals once a suﬃcient number of other entrepreneurs have appeared. At that point,
entrepreneurs make no additional mistakes (relative to normal individuals) and thus im-
pose no extra costs on the population. Because the payoﬀs to both types are increasing
in the probability of being in the correct cascade, which increases with the proportion of
entrepreneurs, ?  1 for suﬃciently large N.
It is noteworthy that the positive information externality works well only when groups
are suﬃciently large. There is a threshold minimum group size necessary for groups to
beneﬁt from overconﬁdent behavior. This suggests economies of scale: small groups are
intrinsically poorly suited towards taking advantage of the information externality, and
15may be poorly equipped, e.g., to deal with new situations in which information aggregation
is especially important. They cannot aﬀord to risk the loss of entrepreneurs in ordinary
situations. The steep slope at the minimum N also suggests that tests of our theory would
do well to focus on situations in which group size increased from a very small to a slightly
larger number of entrepreneurs (holding relatedness constant). In such cases, we would
expect to see an explosion of non-conforming, irrational behavior.
2.7 Omitted Inﬂuences
Although the formal model was based on the speciﬁc concept of informational cascades,
the point of our paper is to argue that overconﬁdence could have evolved as a device that
helps groups to overcome poor information aggregation and to explore their environment
better. Oﬀering only a model, this paper had to ignore a number of other inﬂuences that
can be important. To the extent that other factors can reduce information aggregation or
increase the usefulness of the information, the marginal value of having more overconﬁ-
dence would increase, and we would expect to see more entrepreneurs:
Experimentation Information aggregation is particularly poor when a situation is unique
and choices are discrete, so that individuals cannot repeat and experiment with dif-
ferent choices. As reasoned above, because information aggregation is poorer when
experimentation is not feasible, we would expect to see more entrepreneurs and over-
conﬁdence.
Communication Information aggregation is particularly poor when direct talk (conver-
sation) fails, when it is too cumbersome and costly, or when it is not credible. Con-
versely, information aggregation is better when there is much trust and coordination.
Finally, there should be more overconﬁdence in social species/societies compared to
solitary species/societies.
16Ordering Information aggregation is particularly poor if the most informed (possibly,
most prestigious) individual acts ﬁrst and thereby induces all subsequent individ-
uals to conform (see Zhang (1997)).
Information Costs Information aggregation is particularly poor if individuals have to pur-
chase information instead of being freely endowed with it. (To remedy this, we would
have to deﬁne an entrepreneur as someone who altruistically chooses to purchase in-
formation and act on it.)
Memory Information aggregation is particularly poor if individuals can only observe the
most recent individuals, rather than everyone. The information in the dissent of
a single entrepreneur may be quickly forgotten; it would take a set of consecutive
entrepreneurs to signal to the group that a diﬀerent action would be better.
Changing Environment Information aggregation is more valuable if the environment is
stable enough for the actions of previous individuals to be informative.
In our informational cascade model, agents observe the actions of the other agents
but not their information. But non-cascades settings can oﬀer similar ﬁndings, as long as
the informational group beneﬁts are large relative to the costs to the entrepreneur. For
example, Bolton and Harris (1999) examine a two-armed bandit problem with N agents in
which each agent observes the actions and information generated by the experimentation
of others. They demonstrate that free-rider problems yield suboptimal experimentation
(relative to the social optimum). The presence of overconﬁdent individuals would help to
mitigate these free-rider problems. Cao and Hirshleifer (2000) extend the simple cascades
model to allow early adopters to communicate the payoﬀs (but not the signals) they re-
ceived. They show that informational cascades will still occur with positive probability.
Moreover, they show that it is possible that observing payoﬀs and actions of predecessors
can reduce average welfare when compared to the simple case where only actions can be
17observed. Again, the presence of overconﬁdent individuals would help to mitigate these
free-rider problems.
3 The Public Goods Problem And Intra-Group Survival
3.1 A Stationary Distribution
In the previous model, selection occurred only at the group level, in eﬀect assuming that all
individuals within a group were clones. In this section we sketch an environment in which
the “public goods” problem (suboptimal information acquisition from a social perspective
because it is in everyone’s interest to have someone else acquire the information) exposes
individuals to both group and individual selection. This, combined with the fact that the
beneﬁts to the group can be several orders of magnitude greater than the costs to the
individual, allows entrepreneurs to robustly survive in equilibrium. For example, if the
signal precision is p  0:51 and the group contains 500 individuals, the expected group
beneﬁt to having a ﬁrst entrepreneur with kp0;p  4 is approximately 114 times larger
than the expected cost to this individual!
An entrepreneur can beneﬁt from such large incremental group payoﬀs/survival to the
extent that her genes are “in the same boat” (likely to cosurvive) with those of her other
group members in at least three ways:
Indirect genetic beneﬁts (i.e., kinship/relatedness). Hamilton’srule(e.g., Smith(1989, 169f);
Boyd and Silk (1997, 260ﬀ)) is commonly used in evolutionary genetics to show that
a small set of related altruists can initially increase in numbers when they appear
within a large population of normal individuals. We now show that a variant of this
rule can apply to our entrepreneurs.
18Consider a scenario in which signal precision is p  0:51, and the population con-
sists of a large number of groups, each with N  500 normal individuals and no
entrepreneurs. Now suppose that one group appears which contains a (family with a)
mutation that gives rise to 20 moderately overconﬁdent individuals with kp0;p 
4.3 In a population of many groups composed of normal individuals, the average ﬁt-
ness of normal individuals in the population is not much inﬂuenced by the presence
of 20 entrepreneurs; but the average ﬁtness of the entrepreneurs in the population—
100% of whom enjoy the beneﬁts of the presence of the other entrepreneurs—does
increase dramatically. It is this disproportionate beneﬁt that allows entrepreneurs
to increase in frequency in the overall population of both groups, even though their
frequency in their own group may decrease.4
In this scenario, the expected marginal cost to being the twentieth entrepreneur is
0.0035. The expected marginal beneﬁt to the other 499 individuals from having
this twentieth entrepreneur totals 0.11. Yet, only 19=499  3:8% of the group are
other entrepreneurs (the coeﬃcient of relatedness).5 Furthermore, each of the 19 en-
trepreneurs garner slightly less beneﬁt from the presence of this entrepreneur than
a normal individual, because they tend to act more based on their own information
than on public information. Adding up the expected beneﬁt to entrepreneurs gives a
total gain to the other 19 entrepreneurs of 0:00755 from the presence of the marginal
twentieth entrepreneur. As a group of twenty individuals, the total cost of overcon-
ﬁdence to all entrepreneurs is 0.129, the total beneﬁt is 0.156. Consequently, in the
next generation, entrepreneurial types displace some normal types within the overall
population. (It is not important to the argument that normal types from the group
containing the entrepreneurs will also displace normal types in other groups.)
Direct transfers As in all public goods problems, it is in the group’s interest to ﬁnd a
mechanism to enhance the “internalization” of the positive spillover provided by
19entrepreneurs. In the national economic sphere, internalizing mechanisms could be
patent and copyright protection, or even public recognition and social standing. In a
ﬁrm or institution, a governing body might be able to directly subsidize or discourage
entrepreneurial activity. In small social groups, individuals displaying no intention
to explore the environment could be ostracized (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989)).
It is reasonable to presume that the within-group sharing arrangement is itself subject
to evolutionary pressures, and therefore likely to evolve towards solutions favoring
the outcome that enhances group survival. Consequently, we would expect to see
group institutions evolve that facilitate long-run solutions closer to the group-optimal
?. Yet, if optimal institutions can evolve, they could potentially reduce the need for
biological, irrational overconﬁdence, and augment entrepreneurship with incentives
(transfer subsidies) that are optimal from a group perspective.6
Direct payoﬀ participation Groups can share in their success through economies of scale
and equitable distribution, e.g. in their joint hunting of large prey or conquest of new
territory. While this cannot in itself stop the shrinking proportion of entrepreneurs,
it can increase the absolute number of entrepreneurs. To the extent that groups
with entrepreneurs can maintain relative faster growth than groups without them,
an equilibrium can emerge. This is explored below.
In sum, the large discrepancy between group beneﬁts and individual costs makes it
easy to construct models in which overconﬁdent entrepreneurs can survive. The next
subsection sketches one such possible model.
203.2 A Displacement Model
Distribution of Types Within Groups. We now sketch a model to compute an equilibrium
distribution of entrepreneurs. In each generation t, we pit two groups (g 2 A;B) against
one another, and we pit individuals within groups against one another. We assume that
each group consists of N individuals drawn from an underlying population of groups.
Let ft denote the probability density of -groups in the population at generation t
and deﬁne A;t and B;t to be the realized proportion of entrepreneurs in groups A and
B. Groups and individuals compete a large number of times in each generation, so that
their payoﬀs are the expected payoﬀs computed in Section 2: overconﬁdent individuals
in group g receive payoﬀs EVOCg;t; normal individuals receive EVRg;t; and the
average group payoﬀ is g;tEVOCg;t  1   g;tEVRg;t.
The Contest. The winning group displaces the losing group in the next generation.
Within the winning group, individuals survive in proportion to their relative payoﬀs. Con-












where g denotes the winning group, t a subscript for generation, and w modulates the
relative eﬃciency by which overconﬁdent individuals are replaced by normal individuals
from one generation to the next. For example, assume groups A and B are of size N  100,
signal precision is p  0:6, and overconﬁdence is a modest kp0;p  4. Also, suppose
groups A and B with A  0:05 and B  0:1, respectively, compete. Entrepreneurs in
group A expect to receive a payoﬀ of 0.1644, normal individuals receive 0.2417, for a
group average of 0.2378. Entrepreneurs in group B expect to receive 0.2126, normal types
expect to receive 0.2656, for a group average of 0.2603. Consequently, group B survives,
21but entrepreneurs within this group are in a less favorable position. This latter eﬀect is a
standard within-group “replicator dynamic.” The group competition, however, counterbal-
ances the individual selection pressure. With a w coeﬃcient of 1, entrepreneurs constitute
0:1  0:2126=0:2603  8:2% of the population in the next generation, which is larger than
the 7.5% it was in the previous generation.
One can compute a matrix of the resulting proportion of entrepreneurs, t1, as a func-
tion of the proportion of entrepreneurs in groups A and B. This matrix has certain general
properties. The proportion of entrepreneurs in the next generation declines in cells close
to the diagonal of the matrix, because when the two groups have a similar proportion of
overconﬁdent types, only individual selection pressure remains. Group selection plays
no role when both groups are of equal quality. However, the generational decline in en-
trepreneurs is zero if there are either no or only entrepreneurs (and it is small nearby). In
sum, if the frequency of entrepreneurs across groups has no variance, then group eﬀects
cannot persist and only “pure” groups have a chance of survival.
Moving away from the diagonal cells—i.e. increasing the diﬀerence in the proportion of
entrepreneurs in the two groups—as one group gets closer to the optimal proportion of en-
trepreneurs than its competitor, it tends to win. When the group with more entrepreneurs
is ﬁtter than its competition, group selection favors more entrepreneurs to counterbal-
ance individual selection in favor of more normal types. Thus, in such matrix cells, the
next generation may or may not contain a greater proportion of entrepreneurs than the
average proportion from both groups in the previous generation. Finally, in oﬀ-diagonal
matrix cells in which the group with fewer entrepreneurs is ﬁtter, both individual and
group selection eﬀects reduce the proportion of entrepreneurs in the next generation.
22Equilibrium Distributions. A probability distribution over lambda groups, ft, is a
stationary distribution if:7
ft1  ft: (7)
The degenerate distribution   1 with probability 1 (only entrepreneurs) is a stationary
distribution. However, as explained above, no other degenerate distribution is necessar-
ily an equilibrium, because two equal competing groups face no group pressure, and the
proportion of types would change in favor of normal individuals in the next generation.
Computing a stationary distribution:. To illustrate an equilibrium, consider the pre-
viously used example with groups of size N  100, entrepreneurs of type kp0;p  4,
and information precision p  0:6. There are N  1  101 possible group arrangements.
Deﬁne i;t to be the probability that   i=N for i 2 f0;1;2;:::;Ng. To compute, e.g., the
number of groups with t1  8=100 entrepreneurs in the next generation, we need to
consider all possible competitive scenarios in this generation that can produce 8=100 en-
trepreneurs. For example, we showed above that if A;t  0:05 and B;t  0:1 then the next
generation will have proportion t1  0:082 entrepreneurs. To maintain discreteness, we
assume that the next generation contains proportion 8=100 entrepreneurs with probabil-
ity 80% and 9=100 entrepreneurs with probability 20%. The probability that A;t  0:05
and B;t  0:1 groups meet is 5;t  10;t; consequently, this scenario contributes proba-
bility mass 5;t  10;t  0:8 to the probability of having 8;t1 in the next generation and
5;t10;t0:2 to the probability of having 9;t1 in the next generation. In general, to ﬁnd







whereh apportions probability mass to adjacent fractions to maintain the discreteness
of the distribution. More speciﬁcally, deﬁne yi;j  intt1i;t;j;t  N, the integer




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1   mi;j if x  yi;j
mi;j if x  yi;j  1
0 otherwise
(9)
The stationary distribution requires that x;t1  x;t for all x. The solution to this system
of N  1 nonlinear equations and unknowns is not necessarily unique. Evolution need not
necessarily lead to a unique outcome. Figure 5 graphs a set of viable stationary distributions
in the example case. In this case, the group-optimal ? is 1 (all entrepreneurs)—and the
distribution   1 with probability 1 is also the Pareto-optimal stationary distribution!
Insert Figure 5 about here.
This is a general result:
Proposition 2 If the group optimal proportion of entrepeneurs ? is 1, a (Pareto-dominating)
equilibrium exists in which no groups with any normal types can survive.
Groups with only entrepreneurs face no individual selection pressure and eventually wipe
out all other groups; consequently, normal individuals have no chance to replicate. (This
is not artiﬁcial to our severe penalty for the losing group: even if the losing group shrank
only slowly, the   1 group which does not experience internal selection pressure against
entrepreneurs would still end up eventually displacing all other groups.)
Insert Figure 6 about here.
However, when ?  1, selection pressure against entrepreneurs is strong. For exam-
ple, Figure 6 graphs a set of equilibria when p  0:51, k  12, and N  100. (These
24parameters imply that entrepreneurs tend to act with close to extreme overconﬁdence.)
The ﬁgure shows that entrepreneurs survive in the Pareto-preferred equilibrium, but the
average frequency of entrepreneurs in this stationary distribution is “only” about 1–2%—an
order of magnitude lower than the group-optimum of ?  0:425.
These examples show that overconﬁdence and entrepreneurship can survive in an evo-
lutionary setting. There is a large parameter space in which either all individuals can end
up being entrepreneurs or in which only a certain proportion within the population can
end up being entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, a thorough comparative statics analysis is not
possible because a unique stationary distribution does not exist.
3.3 Group Selection In The Social Sciences
It is generally recognized that although genes are the unit of biological selection, they re-
quire vehicles of selection. These vehicles are the degree to which genes ﬁnd themselves
“in the same boat” with other genes as far as survival is concerned. The vehicles can be
cells (e.g. cancer cells), individuals, kin, villages, tribes, nationalities, ethnicities, races, or
even species. The appropriate question is not whether group vehicles are logically pos-
sible, but whether selection at a higher organizational level can be suﬃciently important
to overwhelm selection at a lower organizational level. The empirical evidence indicates
that group selection can be an important force, especially in human social structures. Yet,
Wilson and Sober (1994) lament that “the most recent developments in biology have not yet
reached the human behavioral sciences, which still know group selection primarily as the
bogey man of the 60’s and 70’s.” They also argue that “social structures...have the eﬀect of
reducing ﬁtness diﬀerences within groups, concentrating natural selection (and functional
organization) at the group level.”
254 Alternative Theories Explaining Overconﬁdence and Entrepreneurs
Our theory has argued that overconﬁdent entrepreneurs are useful, because they broadcast
information and thus break the poor information aggregation intrinsic to conformity.
We are aware of only one alternative explanation for seemingly irrational overconﬁ-
dence, proposed in Trivers (1985) and Hirshleifer (1997): when trying to deceive others
that they are of higher ability, individuals’ credibility is enhanced if they are themselves
convinced of this higher ability. One concern with this argument is that the beneﬁt to over-
conﬁdence rests on an inability or on a willingness of other individuals to let themselves
be deceived. Yet, if discovery costs are not too high, those non-entrepreneurial individuals
who see through the deception would be more likely to survive, relative to individuals who
buy into “overconﬁdence equals ability” argument. Fortunately, our own argument for the
presence of overconﬁdence is synergistic: groups that allow themselves to be “deceived”—
permitting entrepreneurs to procreate as frequently—receive extra information, which in
turn enhances the group’s chances for survival. The willingness to be deceived may in
eﬀect be a transfer of resources from normal types to entrepreneurs.
The alternative prevailing view of entrepreneurship is that entrepreneurs are “tempted”
by high payoﬀs associated with non-conforming. This view considers the innovation to be
an activity in the entrepreneur’s self-interest. In such a setting, if there are diminishing
returns to entrepreneurial activity, an optimal, interior proportion of entrepreneurs may
arise.8 This hypothesis is testably diﬀerent from our hypothesis, in which entrepreneurs
are overconﬁdent, make mistakes on average, and suﬀer in terms of expected payoﬀs. More
realistically, entrepreneurship is likely to be the outcome of both factors: [1] Lower risk
aversion and the lure of payoﬀs substantially higher than those available to the majority,
and a higher tendency for some such risk-loving individuals to survive within their group;
26and [2] a genetic overconﬁdence of entrepreneurs, and a higher tendency for groups with
some such individuals to survive.
In addition to the informational externality and the above-mentioned risky beneﬁts,
there are certainly other real-world facets of entrepreneurship that we have omitted. Still,
the informational beneﬁts of entrepreneurship discussed in our paper are likely to persist
in a much richer model than was considered in our paper.
5 Conclusion
Our paper argues that overconﬁdence (and with it certain forms of entrepreneurship) can
persist because overconﬁdent behavior broadcasts valuable private information to the
group—information which would be lost if rational individuals instead just “followed the
herd.” We explored the costs and beneﬁts to individuals and groups in a simple setting.
A group with too few entrepreneurs falls too easily into an incorrect choice (in which the
entire crowd follows the wrong path), because of poor aggregation of information across
individuals. A group with too many entrepreneurs has too many individuals relying only
on their own information and making mistakes too often, and thus suﬀers from high attri-
tion. The social optimum trades oﬀ the information externality against this attrition. We
also identiﬁed a set of inﬂuences (e.g., group size, information precision, degree of over-
conﬁdence, type of decision, etc.) that inﬂuences the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs
(degree of overconﬁdence) in groups.
Unfortunately, individual selection tends to discriminate against entrepreneurs. From
an economic perspective, this is a particularly severe form of a “public goods” problem.
We then showed that the beneﬁts to the group can easily be two orders of magnitude larger
than the costs to the entrepreneur. We brieﬂy discussed multiple mechanisms by which en-
27trepreneurs may participate in such large payoﬀs, and oﬀered one such model that trades
oﬀ the tendency of overconﬁdent individuals to disappear against the tendency of groups
without overconﬁdent individuals to disappear. We showed that there are situations in
which groups exclusively consisting of entrepreneurs can drive out mixed groups, and
other situations in which entrepreneurs can survive in mixed groups.
We have mixed feelings about group selection, which is rarely found in economic theory
today. Clearly, the ﬁrst best set of explanations for behavior patterns should be based on
individual rationality. But when there is no rational explanation for a widely observed
deviation from rationality, the next best set of explanations should be based on arguments
in which this behavior is helpful to the individual’s group (and preferably of limited harm to
the individual altruist himself). Having invoked such a group selection argument allowed
us to explain and justify the presence of an otherwise seemingly irrational, unjustiﬁable
and ubiquitous behavior pattern—overconﬁdence—while still imposing a discipline on the
types of “reasonable” behavioral anomalies we would permit in a model.
In conclusion, there are many facets to the presence and beneﬁts of entrepreneurs, the
entrepreneurial spirit, and overconﬁdence, not all of which are captured by our model.
But we believe that our theory has captured one important aspect of overconﬁdence and
entrepreneurial culture—a possibly rare but persistent presence of individuals who provide
information to their group—in a simple, reasonable, and intuitive model.
28A Appendix: Recursion formula and proofs
A.1 Recursion formula for state-time probabilities
Let n
s denote the probability of being in state s after n signals that can be inferred if the
truestateis  1. TheseprobabilitiesarerequiredtocomputeE˜ VR;nandE˜ VOC;n
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with the starting value given by 0
0  1 if k  4.
29A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Proof of Part 1: Fix n and let Xi  1 (Xi   1) if the ith signal is high (low) and it can
be publicly inferred. Fix kp0;p  k, let Y1n denote the random number of publicly
inferred signals by the nth arrival if   1 and let Y2n denote the random number of
publicly inferred signals by the nth arrival if   2. Without loss of generality, let 1 > 2.
The state of publicly observed information at the nth arrival is S1
n 
PY1n




i1 Xi if   2.
The ex-ante probability that a rational individual makes an incorrect decision if she is
the nth arrival is equal to the probability that she accepts the project when the project is
an incorrect one (   1) plus the probability that she does not accept the project when
the project is a good one (  1). Thus, the probability of making an incorrect decision
when   j is:
PrS
j
n  1j   1  Pr   1  PrS
j


















n  0j  1:
(A2)
If 1 > 2 then Y1n is stochastically larger than Y2n; i.e. PrY1n > a 
PrY2n > a8a and 8n. Consequently,
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n  0j  1
(A3)
where the inequality follows from the fact that f is a decreasing function because the
Xi are iid with EXi > 0 and Y1n is stochastically larger than Y2n. See Ross (1983,
Proposition 8.1.2).
For ﬁxed , simply let Y1n denote the random number of publicly inferred signals
by the nth arrival if k  k1 and let Y2n denote the random number of publicly inferred
signals by the nth arrival if k  k2 and w.l.o.g. let k1 > k2. Now the remainder of the proof
is identical to the proof above.
Finally, since Xi are iid with EXi > 0 the probability of making an incorrect decision
decreases with each successive arrival when  and k are ﬁxed. Thus, the greater is N the
smaller is the ex ante probability that a rational type will make an incorrect decision.




Abarbanell, J. S., and V. L. Bernard, 1992, “Tests of Analysts’ Overreaction/Underreaction
to Earnings Information as An Explanation for Anomalous Stock Price Behavior,” The
Journal of Finance, 47(3), 1181–1208.
Ainslie, G., 1975, “Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness,” Psychological
Bulletin, 82(4), 463–496.
Anderson, L. R., and C. A. Holt, 1996, “Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” American
Economic Review, 87(5), 847–862.
Banerjee, A. V., 1992, “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
107(3), 797–818.
Batchelor, R., and P. Dua, 1992, “Conservatism and Consensus-seeking among Economic
Forecasters,” Journal of Forecasting, 11(2), 169–181.
Becker, G. S., 1976, “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 14(3), 817–826.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, 1992, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, 100(5),
992–1026.
Bolton, P., and C. Harris, 1999, “Strategic Experimentation,” Econometrica, 67(2), 349–374.
Boyd, R., and P. J. Richerson, 1988, “An Evolutionary Model of Social Learnings: The Eﬀects
of Spatial and Temporal Variation,” in Social Learning, ed. by T. R. Zentall, and J. Bennett
G. Galef. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Hillsdale, New Jersey.
Boyd, R., and J. B. Silk, 1997, How Humans Evolved. W. W. Norton & Company, New York,
London.
Busenitz, L. W., and J. B. Barney, 1997, “Diﬀerences between Entrepreneurs and Managers
in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making,” Journal of
Business Venturing, 12(1), 9–30.
32Cao, H., and D. Hirshleifer, 2000, “Conversation, Observational Learning, and Informational
Cascades,” working paper, Ohio State University.
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., 1969, “Genetic drift in an italian population,” Scientiﬁc American, 221,
30.
Cooper, A. C., C. A. Woo, and W. Dunkelberg, 1988, “Entrepreneurs Perceived Chances for
Success,” Journal of Business Venturing, 3, 97–108.
Cornell, B., and R. Roll, 1981, “Strategies for Pairwise Competitions in Markets and Orga-
nizations,” Bell Journal of Economics, 12(1), 201–216.
Daniel, K., D. Hirshleifer, and A. Subrahmanyam, 1998, “A Theory of Overconﬁdence, Self-
Attribution, and Security Market Under- and Over-reaction,” The Journal of Finance,
53(5), 1839–1886.
DeBondt, W. F. M., and R. H. Thaler, 1995, “Financial Decision-Making in Markets and Firms:
A Behavioral Perspective,” in Finance, ed. by R. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic, and W. Ziemba.
Elsevier/Horth Holland, Amsterdam, vol. 9 of Handbook in Operations Research and
Management Science, chap. 13, pp. 385–410.
Delong, B. J., A. Shleifer, L. Summers, and R. J. Waldmann, 1991, “The Survival of Noise
Traders in Financial Markets,” Journal of Business, 64(1), 1–20.
Eshel, I., L. Samuelson, and A. Shaked, 1998, “Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local
Interaction Model,” American Economic Review, 88(1), 157–179.
Hirshleifer, D., 1997, “An Adaptive Theory of Self Deception,” working paper, University
of Michigan, Graduate School of Business.
Hirshleifer, D., and G. Luo, 2001, “On the Survival of Overconﬁdent Traders in a Competitive
Securities Market,” Journal of Financial Markets, 4, 73–84.
Hirshleifer, D., and E. Rasmusen, 1989, “Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
with Ostracism,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12(1), 87–106.
33Hirshleifer, J., 1977, “Economics from a Biological Viewpoint,” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 20(1), 1–52.
, 1987, “On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises,” in The latest on
the best: Essays on evolution and optimality, ed. by J. Dupre. Mit Press, Cambridge, MA,
pp. 307–326.
Hirshleifer, J., and J. C. Martinez-Coll, 1988, “What Strategies can support the Evolutionary
Emergence of Cooperation?,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 32(2), 367–398.
Lewontin, R. C., 1974, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change. Columbia University Press,
New York, NY.
Manove, M., 1998, “Entrepeneurs, Optimism, and the Competitive Edge,” working paper,
Boston University.
Odean, T., 1998, “Volume, Volatility, Price and Proﬁt When All Traders are Above Average,”
The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1887–1934.
Robert M. Gibson, and Jacob Hoglund, 1992, “Copying and Sexual Selection,” TREE, 7(7),
229–232.
Rogers, A. R., 1988, “Does Biology constrain Culture?,” American Anthropologist, pp. 819–
831.
, 1994, “Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection,” American Economic
Review, 84(3), 461–481.
Ross, M., and F. Sicoly, 1979, “Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution,” The Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 322–336.
Ross, S. M., 1983, Stochastic Processes. Wiley Books, New York.
Smith, J. M., 1974, “The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conﬂicts,” Journal
of Theoretical Biology, pp. 209–219.
, 1989, Evolutionary Genetics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
34Trivers, R., 1985, Social Evolution. Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, CA.
Waldman, M., 1994, “Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection,” American
Economic Review, 84(3), 482–497.
Wang, A., 2001, “Overconﬁdence, Investor Sentiment, and Evolution,” working paper, Rice
University, Journal of Financial Intermediation, forthcoming.
Weibull, J. W., 1995, Evolutionary Game Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Welch, I., 1992, “Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades,” Journal of Finance, 47(2), 695–
732.
Wilson, D. S., and E. Sober, 1994, “Re-introducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral
Sciences,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/bbs/, featured
in Scientiﬁc American (7-96).
Zhang, J., 1997, “Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 28(1), 188–205.
35Notes
1Ross and Sicoly (1979) outline why information availability and attribution can have
an egocentric bias, and much of their argument would naturally apply to an egocentric
bias on judgment about relative precision of own vs. other’s information. In updating
a mean estimate, the relatively lower subjective variance about the internalized estimate
compared to the external estimate would then lead subjects to put too much weight on their
internal information and too little weight on external information. While such behavior (by
security analysts) has been documented in Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Batchelor
and Dua (1992), experimental studies of overconﬁdence that we are aware of show only
that subjects’ internal information generates assessments with too narrow a range. We are
unaware of experimental studies that test the relative overconﬁdence about internalized
vs. new external information.
2When the type of individual is unknown, each conforming individual could be an en-
trepreneur or a normal individual. This causes the public state Sn (deﬁned below) to drift
(slowly) as more individuals conform. The algebra gets more complex (see Anderson and
Holt (1996)), but the intuition of our paper remains: information aggregation is poor, and
overconﬁdence /entrepreneurs can provide useful information to their group.
3In standard biology models, simultaneous within-group appearance is assumed in that
members of sibgroups interact only with other members of their sibgroup (although these
members need not be of the same genotype). Similarly, in Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked
(1998), altruists survive only if they are clustered together with other altruists, but the
method to produce spacially correlated distributions of types is diﬀerent: Altruists can
appear by imitating other altruists around them, which allows one altruist to more likely
beneﬁt other altruists.
364Both the consideration of small changes in characteristics (such as our introduction
of just modest overconﬁdence), and the consideration of a simultaneous appearance of
just a few altruistic individuals within the same group is standard practice in evolutionary
biology. If group beneﬁts were not captured disproportionately by other entrepreneurs,
altruism (overconﬁdence ) would quickly disappear. Put diﬀerently, if the main beneﬁcia-
ries were egoists, the altruistic type would likely disappear before it could help enough
another altruistic types to garner a survival beneﬁt. Such a “proximity of types” condition
is necessary in calculations which employ Hamilton’s Rule to show that biological altruism
can increase and is usually accomplished by computing payoﬀs over paired sibgroups.
5Relatedness on the order of 5–10% is not implausible. Because marriage occurs pri-
marily in proximity (geographical, cultural), there is more genetic similarity among groups
than suggested by gene dispersion by random mating. This is readily visible in some per-
sistent local, regional, national, ethnic, and racial physical traits. For example, the gene for
dark skin is ubiquitous in sub-saharan Africa and non-existent in Europe. For a more ran-
dom set of polymorphic genes/traits subject more to genetic drift than selection, Lewontin
(1974) estimates that 85.4% of the genetic variance among humans is between individuals,
8.3% between populations, and 6.3% is between races. Cavalli-Sforza (1969) ﬁnds that in-
dividuals in alpine villages in the Parma valley of Italy display a genetic similarity of about
3%.
6The issue of social/cultural mechanisms as replacements for biological mechanisms is
itself rather interesting, and the subject of much debate between sociologists and biologists
(e.g., Rogers (1988)). For our paper, we note that the evolution of social institutions is
only fairly recent in the history of homo sapiens, while imitation has been documented in
many vertebrate species (see, e.g., Robert M. Gibson and Jacob Hoglund (1992)). Finally,
social mechanisms could also exert pressure towards other, non-overconﬁdence based
37mechanisms that help to resolve the information aggregation problem diﬀerently, e.g.,
with culture and conversation.
7This is a diﬀerent deﬁnition from the standard evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) deﬁni-
tion, because we are also concerned with across-group dynamics and not only with within-
group dynamics.
8Models in which individuals can either follow or learn (but not both) and in which the
marginal cost/beneﬁts to both activities are equal in equilibrium can be found in Boyd and
Richerson (1988) and Rogers (1988). This typically results in learning that is suboptimal
from a group-perspective. Biological models in which some, but not all individuals pursue
an activity in their own self-interest, and in which an optimum interior proportion develops,
can be found in Smith (1974), Cornell and Roll (1981), and Weibull (1995).
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Correct Choice − No Entrepreneurs
Incorrect Choice − No Entrepreneurs
Correct Choice − 5% Entrepreneurs, Modest OC
Incorrect Choice − 5% Entrepreneurs, Modest OC
Correct Choice − 5% Entrepreneurs, Extreme OC
Incorrect Choice − 5% Entrepreneurs, Extreme OC
Figure Legend:
Figure 1 shows the probabilities that normal individuals late in the queue end up in a correct
and in an incorrect informational cascade, as a function of the private signal precision (p) in a
group of N  250 individuals. The probability of not being in a cascade approaches 0 very rapidly.
For example, the 10th individual is in a cascade with probability 97.5% if p  0:6, 99% if p  0:75,
and 99.98% if p  0:9. The 50th individual is in a cascade with probability in excess of 99.99999%
for these three p’s. The inner-most two lines are the probabilities of ending up in a right or a
wrong cascade in the straight informational cascade without entrepreneurs scenario. The outer
lines are the same probabilities in the presence of 5% entrepreneurs with modest overconﬁdence
(kp0;p  12) and extreme overconﬁdence (kp0;p  1).
39Figures
Bernardo/Welch
Legend for Fig.2of 6
JEMS
Pictogram:
0 10 20 30 40 50









































Signal Precision p=0.51, Group Size N=50
Signal Precision p=0.51, Group Size N=500
Signal Precision p=0.60, Group Size N=50
Signal Precision p=0.60, Group Size N=500
Figure Legend:
Figure 2 plots the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs (?) as a function of the degree of
overconﬁdence (k) for two values of individuals’ signal precision p and group size N. The ﬁgure
shows that when the degree of overconﬁdence becomes more extreme, it is better for groups
to contain fewer entrepreneurs. When overconﬁdence is modest, however, it can be optimal for
groups to contain only entrepreneurs.
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Population N=50, Extreme OC
Population N=100, Extreme OC
Population N=250, Extreme OC
Population N=500, Extreme OC
Population N=250, Medium OC (k=12)
Population N=50, Modest OC (k=7)
Jump to 1
Figure Legend:
Figure 3 plots the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs (?) as a function of each individual’s
private signal precision (p). Holding group size constant (see legend), the optimal proportion of
entrepreneurs decreases with private signal precision; over a certain range, the optimal proportion
of entrepreneurs can be either one or zero.
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Figure 4 plots the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs (?) as a function of group size (N)
for various degrees of overconﬁdence (k) and holding private signal precision constant at p  0:6.
(A higher p would shift the respective functions towards the south-east.) When overconﬁdence is
inﬁnite, the optimal proportion of entrepreneurs is zero for small N, then reaches a maximum, and
ﬁnally asymptotes towards zero. When overconﬁdence k is ﬁnite, the optimal proportion closely
closely tracks the inﬁnite-overconﬁdence proportion below a critical population size, and quickly
converges to 100% just above this critical population size.
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Figure 5 plots some stationary strategy distributions (i;t 8i) when population size N is 100,
signal precision p is 0.51, and overconﬁdence kp0;p is a modest 4. In this example, the socially
optimal proportion of entrepreneurs is 100%. Although the (unplotted) Pareto-optimal stationary
distribution has mass 100% at   1, other plotted distributions are also stationary from an
evolutionary perspective. For example, the rightmost plotted distribution shows that if 1% of
groups in the population have 90 entrepreneurs, 21.2% have 91 entrepreneurs, and 77.8% have 92
entrepreneurs, then so will the next generation.
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Figure 6 plots some stationary strategy distributions when population size N is 100, signal
precision p is 0.51, and overconﬁdence (k) is a large 12. The socially optimal proportion of en-
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